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Abstract 
This study observes the impact of CEO succession on stock price of Malaysian Public Listed 
Companies (PLCs). Standard event study methodology is used to examine the immediate price effects 
of all Bursa Malaysia listed firms that announced CEO succession 2008 to 2010. The finding shows 
that the market is indifferent on the date of announcement. However, there are significant positive 
abnormal returns of 1.5 % in 10 days before the announcement date using market model approach 
and market adjusted return model.   
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of JIBES University, 
Jakarta   
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1.0 Introduction 
CEO succession provides a means for assessing the efficacy of leaders in shaping firm s fortune. As noted 
by Davidson et al. (2006), leadership is an important component of successful corporate governance 
which can enhance firms performance. The effect of managerial replacement on firm performance 
remains a debate in spite of a number of studies and renewed attention to this problem (e.g., Allen, Panian 
&  Lotz, 1979; Brown, 1982; Friedman & Singh, 1989). Previous study show mixed results regarding the 
impact of CEO succession on firm s stock price. For example, Friedman and Singh (1989) found that 
stockholders reactions towards CEO succession were positive when pre-succession performance was 
poor. In contrast, succession that occurred when performance had been good resulted in negative 
consequences. On the other hand, a study by Davidson et al. (2002) find that the stock market reacts more 
positively to outside CEO selection announcements and when the CEO comes from the industry that is 
related to the firm s activities. Meanwhile, a study by Chung et al. (1987) found that the selection of 
insiders or outsiders by low performing firms does not have any significant influence on firms post 
succession performance because investors do not believe that change in CEO will improve firms future 
performance. This inconclusive result may be due to different view adopted in performing those studies 
(i.e. common sense, vicious and ritual-scapegoating). The common sense view claims that post succession 
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performance will improve following the replacement of ineffective CEO with more capable CEO. In 
contrast, the vicious view expects that post succession performance become more disruptive as the 
succession of CEO had destroyed the fit between firms and their environment including their internal 
authority relationship. Finally, the ritual-scapegoating view discusses that there is no change in post 
succession performance because the existing powerful CEO remains at his post while the weaker 
subordinates were replaced as a corrective actions taken by firms following poor performance (Allen, 
Panian & Lotz, 1979). As previous studies provide mixed results and limited studies on CEO succession 
have been conducted in emerging market. Therefore, the objective of this study is to fill in gap by 
providing evidence on the price impact of CEO succession in Malaysia using on market model and 
market adjusted return model.   
2.0 Literature review and hypothesis development 
Previous literatures on the announcement effect of top executive management departure have been mixed.  
Reinganum (1985) and Cools, Mirjam and Praag (2007) find no significant abnormal abnormal returns on 
the announcement of top management turnover while Dahya and McConnell (2005), Denis and Denis 
(1995),  Furtado and Rozeff (1987), and Lambertides (2009) find a significant positive abnormal returns 
to top executive turnover announcements. Likewise, Adams and Mansi (2009) find that CEO turnover 
announcements are value increasing to shareholders especially when the turnover is forced and when the 
successor is from outside of the firm or from other industry. On the other hand, Dedman and Lin (2002) 
find that the market reacts negatively to the announcement of top management turnover especially in the 
case of involuntary departure or the top executive leave to take another job. Setiawan, Hananto and Kee 
(2011) study the effect of CEO turnover announcements for firms in Indonesia and find no significant 
difference in volume turnover before and after the announcements for the full sample firms but significant 
positive difference is evidenced for subsample firms especially when the turnover is non-routine. The 
mixed results of previous studies showed that CEO succession can have significant impacts on 
shareholder wealth. Clayton, Hartzel and Rosenberg (2003) explain that the wealth effect associated with 
the announcement of CEO succession can be decomposed into an information effect and real effect. The 
information effect refers to the changes of CEO signal firm future performance are worse than previously 
believed, while the real effect explains that the new CEO is expected to improve firm performance. Both 
information effect and real effect is similar to vicious theory and common sense theory proposed by 
Allen, Panian and Lotz (1979).  Furtado and Karan (1990) in their summary of CEO succession articles, 
cite 10 that estimate the announcement effect of CEO succession. They find mixed results regarding the 
effect of CEO announcement on share price which indicates that CEO succession announcement may 
bring good and bad news to shareholders.  However, the information effect dominates the positive real 
effects. In other words, CEO succession signal a bad news as shareholders react negatively towards CEO 
turnover and selection of new successor. Following above argument, the following hypothesis is 
developed.  
H1: The stock market reacts significantly to CEO succession announcement.   
3.0 Methods 
This study focuses on assessing the price effects of CEO turnover and selection announcements. The 
CEO turnover date is the last date of duty of the departing CEO while the CEO selection date is the first 
date of duty of the succeeding CEO. Both of these announcement dates are publicly available online on 
the Bursa Malaysia s website. All public listed firms that have announced CEO turnover and selection 
from the year 2008 to 2010 are included in the sample. Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), among 
others, popularized event studies methodologies to capture stock prices respond to new information. Fama 
(1998) emphasized that an underlying assumption in announcement effect studies is that any lag response 
of prices to a given event is short-lived and therefore have little effect on estimates of unexpected or 
abnormal returns. Consequently, methods used in announcement returns are not controversial. This study 
175 Rokiah Ishak and Rohaida Abdul Latif /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  65 ( 2012 )  173 – 179 
uses market model and market adjusted return model to measure initial market reaction to CEO turnover 
announcements using methods proposed by MacKinlay (1997).Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) is 
used as market or benchmark index. Daily prices for each firm s succession and turnover dates and KLCI 
are gathered beginning from 201 days prior to the announcement date to the 30 days after the 








where,              Ri,t : return on firm i during day t 
Pi,t : price of firm i shares at the end of day t 
Pi,t-1 : price of firm i shares at the end of day t-1 
Similarly, the daily market return    
Rm,t =      CI t - CI t-1    
        CI t-1 
where,             Rm,t : Return on Composite Index during day  t 
CIt : Composite Index level at the end of day t 
CIt-1 : Composite Index level at the end of day t-1 
Abnormal or abnormal returns for each day t are computed by comparing daily firms and market s 
returns as follows:   
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where,             AR i,t is the abnormal return of i firm on day t, 
Ri,t    is return on firm i during the period t, 
Rm,t  is return on Composite Index during the period t 
ii and   are parameters estimated using the estimation period if market model 
is used and i = 0 and i = 1 if market adjusted return model is used. 
Daily abnormal returns on each event day for all sample firms are cumulated and then divided by the 








1i    








ei  is the variance of the residuals of firm i from market model estimation while for market 





.  AARt  is normally distributed and Z-
statistics is equal to AARt divided by square root of the variance. Next, the cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAAR) are calculated from an earlier date, t1 to a later date, t2.    
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, where CARi,t1,t2 is the cumulative 
abnormal return of firm i from period t1 to t2. CAARt1,t2 is normally distributed and Z-statistics is equal 
to CAARt1,t2 divided by square root of the variance.  In both immediate price effects tests, announcement 
of CEO turnover and selection, it is hypothesized that the AAR and CAAR over the announcement dates 
are equal to zero.  
4.0 Results and discussion 
This section explains the results of immediate price performance of CEO succession. Table 1 shows that 
for the year 2008 to 2010, there were a total of 247 announcements of CEO succession. To reduce 
confounding effects, all announcements were clear from major announcement such as merger, acquisition 
and earnings announcements.   
Table 1. Distribution of CEO succession announcements by year 





                   
To assess the immediate price effects of the announcement of CEO succession, this  
study employs both market model (MM) and market adjusted return model (MAR). This study uses the 
earlier date between the announcements of CEO turnover or the announcement of CEO successor. Most 
of the dates are very close to each other, thus choosing the earlier between the two is warranted to capture 
the earliest reaction of the news. Based on 247 samples, Table 2 compares the average abnormal returns 
(AAR) for day -10 to day +3 surrounding the announcement of CEO succession using MM and MAR. 
From Table 2, there is a positive but insignificant abnormal return of about 0.56% on the day of the 
announcement using MM and MAR. Table 3 presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) 
for different window periods using MM and MAR respectively. There is no significant difference in 
CAAR surrounding the announcement date, day -1 to day 1 according to either MM or MAR. However, 
the CAARs are positively significant on day -10 to day 0, day -3 to day 0 and day -5 to day 0. However, 
market is indifferent on the day of the announcement itself regardless of the model used.  Similar to 
Reinganum (1985) and Cools et al. (2007), this study does not find any significant different in abnormal 
returns on the announcement of CEO turnover.  It seems that market is not surprised on the 
announcements of CEO departure. There are a couple of reasons as to why the announcements are not a 
surprise. Firstly, the announcement of top executive departures and successions are made mandatory in 
Malaysia as prescribed by Bursa Malaysia  Listing Requirement Para 9 under changes in management 
structure (Bursa Malaysia, 2007).  Secondly, given that many Malaysian firms are tightly owned by 
family members or block holders as mentioned by Thillainathan (1999) and Gibson (2003), the news 
regarding the departure of the CEO may had been widely spread and anticipated by major shareholders 
who also serve as directors and therefore it could be argued that market has predicted the events, therefore 
the changes in prices may have taken place even prior to the official announcement made on Bursa 
Malaysia website.   
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Table 2. AAR for day -10 to day +3 surrounding the announcement of CEO turnover between MM 
and MAR  
Market Model(MM) Market Adjusted Return Model (MAR) 
Event 
day AAR STDEV Z score P-value AAR STDEV Z score P-value 
-10 -0.0034 0.0453 -1.1818 0.2384 -0.0030 0.0288 -1.6561 0.0990 
-9 0.0000 0.0497 -0.0077 0.9938 0.0044 0.0324 2.1230 0.0348** 
-8 0.0050 0.0347 2.2743 0.0238** 0.0017 0.0245 1.0891 0.2772 
-7 -0.0021 0.0328 -1.0251 0.3063 -0.0006 0.0226 -0.4185 0.6760 
-6 -0.0041 0.0619 -1.0306 0.3038 -0.0016 0.0397 -0.6426 0.5211 
-5 0.0067 0.0504 2.0940 0.0373** 0.0021 0.0357 0.9189 0.3590 
-4 -0.0031 0.0999 -0.4911 0.6238 -0.0038 0.0901 -0.6732 0.5014 
-3 0.0051 0.0434 1.8456 0.0662* 0.0014 0.0228 0.9978 0.3194 
-2 -0.0024 0.0640 -0.5810 0.5618 0.0019 0.0327 0.9293 0.3537 
-1 0.0091 0.1013 1.4152 0.1583 0.0070 0.0948 1.1699 0.2432 
0 0.0056 0.0987 0.8969 0.3706 0.0057 0.0928 0.9770 0.3295 
1 -0.0032 0.0376 -1.3272 0.1857 -0.0060 0.0435 -2.1733 0.0307** 
2 0.0018 0.0483 0.6015 0.5480 0.0011 0.0208 0.8223 0.4117 
3 -0.0044 0.0454 -1.5291 0.1275 -0.0029 0.0325 -1.3923 0.1651 
** indicates significant at 5% level, * indicates significant at 10 % level   
Table 3. CAAR for different windows surrounding CEO announcement dates using MM and MAR  
CAAR (Market Model) 
CAAR (Market Adjusted Return 
Model) 
Windows CAAR STDEV t-stat p-value CAAR STDEV t-stat p-value 
CAAR -
60,30 0.0034 0.4249 0.1246 0.9010 
9.975E-
05 0.2354 0.0066 0.9947 
CAAR -
60,10 0.0007 0.3481 0.0314 0.9750 0.0076 0.2163 0.5509 0.5822 
CAAR -




10,10 0.0158 0.1764 1.4084 0.1603 0.0102 0.1191 1.3422 0.1808 
CAAR -
10,0 0.0165 0.1426 1.8153 0.0707* 0.0152 0.0918 2.5960 0.0100** 
CAAR -
5,5 0.0164 0.1629 1.5821 0.1149 0.0036 0.1276 0.4481 0.6545 
CAAR -
5,0 0.0211 0.1427 2.3220 0.0211** 0.0144 0.1108 2.0361 0.0428** 
CAAR -
3,3 0.0117 0.1740 1.0610 0.2897 0.0084 0.1521 0.8629 0.3889 
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CAAR -
3,0 0.0175 0.1543 1.7815 0.0761* 0.0161 0.1359 1.8638 0.0635* 
CAAR -
1,1 0.0116 0.1454 1.2518 0.2118 0.0068 0.1381 0.7697 0.4422 
CAAR -
1,0 0.0148 0.1417 1.6368 0.1030 0.0128 0.1330 1.5060 0.1334 
** indicates significant at 5% level, * indicates significant at 10 % level  
Even though, the MM and MAR coefficient is not significant on the announcement date, the positive sign 
shows that CEO succession announcements signal good news to investors. They believed that the 
turnover of the former CEO and the selection of new CEO will bring a good image to a company.  
However, finding of this study also reveal that there are also significant positive price drifts in the days 
prior to the announcement starting from day -8, day -5, and day -3 according to MM. This situation 
explains that the rumours of CEO succession already spread before the actual date of the announcement 
of CEO succession. In other words, shareholders react prior to CEO succession announcement made by 
company and rely on speculation and rumours spreading in media or financial press. The positive sign of 
both MM and MAR coefficients display that CEO succession is welcomed by investors. Thus, finding of 
this study mildly supports the common sense view of succession that CEO succession is good news to 
investor as they believed that performance of the company may improve following CEO succession.  
However, regarding post succession performance, Market Adjusted Return Model in Table 2 detected a 
significant negative reaction of 0.6% on day 1 after the announcement of CEO succession date.  This 
finding implies that CEO change has disrupted firm post-succession performance which supports the 
vicious theory of succession. The possible reason for this situation may be investor view that the new 
successor is not capable enough to improve firm future performance or may be the new CEO s capability 
is lower compared to the former CEO (Friedman and Singh, 1989).  Furthermore, Boeker (1992) provides 
an explanation regarding performance disruption following CEO succession. He mentions that CEO 
succession can destroy the fit between an organization and its environment. In addition, CEO succession 
also can disrupt internal authority relations, breaking the unity of command and disturbing work patterns 
that may lead to other management changes, as new policies will be introduced in the organization by the 
new CEO team. Thus, CEO successions are substantial enough to result in harmful misalignments with 
the firm s environment which leads to performance disruption.    
5.0 Conclusion 
This study examines market reactions on the announcement of CEO succession. Using market model and 
market adjusted model, this study fails to detect any significant market reactions on the day of CEO 
succession announcements. However, our findings showed that there is a positive reaction 10 days prior 
to CEO succession announcement which imply that there is a leakage of information prior to formal 
announcements made by a company. The positive reaction indicates that CEO succession announcement 
is greeted favourably by investors. In contrast, this study also finds a negative reaction a day after 
succession, which explains that the new successor is not welcomed by investors. The shareholders may 
view that the new successor is not capable enough to manage the company as compared to the former 
CEO.   
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